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Despite their obvious and enormous importance, it’s easy 
for philosophers to ignore the economic forces that shape the 
human use of animals. The tools we bring to bear on the prob-
lems of animal use and abuse are generally focused on individ-
uals—e.g., their moral failings, their epistemic shortcomings, 
and so on. Increasingly, of course, philosophers are devoting 
more attention to structural factors that influence our beliefs 
and behaviors, but very few of us know enough of the relevant 
social science to theorize about them in detail. In such circum-
stances, Stephen McMullen’s Animals and the Economy is an 
especially welcome contribution to the literature. 
Setting aside the introduction and conclusion, the book has 
ten chapters. In the first two, McMullen summarizes the status 
of animals in the economy—namely, the normal ways in which 
they are used, the economic institutions that promote and pre-
serve that use, and the various respects in which economic the-
ory is stacked against recognizing the interests of animals. The 
next two chapters provide a depressing overview of the reasons 
why the economy fails to provide consumers with products that 
were derived from animals who enjoy(ed) decent lives, and 
generally stands in the way of ethical consumer action. Never-
theless, he tries to show that consumers remain responsible for 
purchasing morally objectionable animal products, and makes 
the case that consumer action does in fact make a difference.
In the following pair of chapters, McMullen considers pro-
ducers. He shows that, in our current regulatory system, they 
have few options other than sacrificing welfare for the sake of 
profit: the margins are just too slim. He also contends that regu-
lation could, in fact, improve the situation of animals, and he 
makes some tentative suggestions about how those regulations 
might function.
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Finally, after a brief discussion of animal experimentation, 
McMullen uses the remaining chapters to explore the notion of 
animals as property. Gary Francione, of course, argues that the 
basic right of animals is not to be human property. McMullen 
argues, to the contrary, that we don’t need to abandon entirely 
the property framework to achieve the aims we might have for 
animals, and, in fact, preserving that framework may actually 
provide us with some tools to promote their rights and well-
being. The book wraps up with an alternative theory of animal 
ownership that’s designed to secure just these ends.
Anyone working in animal ethics ought to make time for 
this thoughtful introduction to, and reflection on the possible 
futures of, the place of animals in the economy. It is well-
researched, accessible, and full of striking insights into the 
mechanisms behind all too familiar practices. There is much 
on which to comment, but I’ll limit myself to the issue that I 
found particularly striking: namely, McMullen’s discussion of 
consumer responsibility.
Let me summarize, very briefly, just a few of the points that 
McMullen makes about the way that the economy stacks the 
deck against the interests of animals.
Most obviously, the mere fact that something is for sale tends 
to signal that it’s permissible to buy and consume it. You can’t 
purchase human arms in the grocery store, but you can certain-
ly buy chicken wings. That strongly suggests that there’s a cat-
egorical difference between them, and we shouldn’t overlook 
the way that what’s for sale shapes our moral vision. But even 
if we set aside the symbolic significance of animal products 
being commodities, we can see that our particular economy is 
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set up to enable and encourage the purchasing of animal bodies 
and byproducts.
Consider, first, that consumer preferences are shaped in part 
by advertising campaigns, some of which are federally funded, 
and which are heavily skewed toward animal products. Second, 
a large market economy makes it difficult to know how goods 
are produced, and there are legitimate reasons to be suspicious 
about the various sources of information available to consum-
ers. Ethical information is, after all, difficult to communicate 
effectively credibly to consumers: this creates a “systematic 
bias toward goods whose primary virtues are visible quality or 
low-cost” (55). Third, there is also a bias toward goods that are 
entirely fungible, which strongly incentivizes the kind of mass 
production that’s so harmful to animals.
Fourth, agricultural markets have three features that spread 
responsibility across producers, distributors, and consumers. 
For instance, the harms to animals are overdetermined. No 
one individual is necessary for them to occur. Moreover, the 
choices people make are interdependent. Each one relies on the 
acts of others to accomplish his or her ends. Additionally, the 
decision that actually results in harm isn’t due to a single factor. 
Instead, a long list of considerations explains why welfare stan-
dards are such as they are in factory farms. Finally, McMullen 
surveys some experimental work that seems to show that moral 
considerations are less likely to guide our behavior as markets 
exhibit more and more of these features. So, it seems that the 
size and structure of the market make it quite difficult to feel 
accountable for the harms of animal agriculture, which lowers 
the odds that consumers will be motivated to lobby for signifi-
cant changes.
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Now, McMullen doesn’t spend much time arguing that con-
sumers bear some responsibility for their purchasing decisions. 
Nor does he say much about the extent of this responsibility, 
or whether it rises to the level of making individual purchases 
morally wrong. However, it’s clear that he does think that con-
sumers bear some responsibility and that they can act wrongly 
by purchasing; if this weren’t his view, it would be hard to ex-
plain why he would spend so much time arguing that there are, 
in fact, things that consumers can do to improve the lot of ani-
mals. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is reason to won-
der whether his work undermines the charge that consumers 
act wrongly by buying animal products, whatever their origins. 
Here, in short, is the line of reasoning that I have in mind.
When people act wrongly, we tend to blame them for 
it. There are, of course, plenty of cases in which people act 
wrongly but excusably, and then we don’t. But those aren’t the 
norm. Instead, those are circumstances where unusual fac-
tors somehow change the relevant moral calculus. With that in 
mind, note that we ordinarily don’t blame consumers for buy-
ing animal products. This isn’t because they have no choice 
but to buy meat and milk: there are plenty of morally superior 
options available. However, the structural forces just outlined 
have some notable affects. They shape and satisfy consumer 
demand, they increase the burden on anyone who wants to 
shop in nonstandard ways, they make it hard to know who to 
trust for information, and the sheer size of the market makes 
it plain that, at best, any individual’s impact is probabilistic, 
which lowers the motivation to act. Moreover given how few 
others are acting, an understandable (albeit unfortunate) fatal-
ism tends to emerge. These facts seem to go a long way toward 
explaining why we are so tolerant of those who purchase ani-
mal products, even when we are their friends and family, and 
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so have standing to blame them. But if we don’t blame them, 
then we should wonder whether they’re really acting wrongly.
Compare this to our decision not to blame one another for 
failing to give much to charity. Parallel structural forces seem 
to explain why we treat giving as supererogatory, appealing to 
the better angels of our nature to promote good behavior. This 
suggests that we think that while it would be very good to give, 
and there are strong moral reasons to do so, they don’t rise—
in our particular circumstances, and contra Singer-style argu-
ments—to the level of obligation. If the opposite were true, we 
would expect our blaming practices to be quite different, at 
least among those who have been moved by the relevant argu-
ments. But they aren’t, and likewise with respect to purchasing 
animal products. If all that’s so with respect to giving, it might 
be so with respect to our food consumption patterns too.
I get no pleasure from this conclusion, and I hope that it’s 
wrong. But it’s difficult to take a long, hard look at the pow-
erful forces that influence and even constrain our behavior 
without adopting a more modest view of the culpability that at-
taches to any one individual. Even if that’s right, however, there 
may be a silver lining. Thinking clearly about the ethics of the 
human use of animals may well require developing new, inter-
disciplinary conceptions of moral responsibility, ones that take 
better account of the ways in which markets have sway over 
our lives. McMullen’s book—and ones like it—could guide us 
as we take the first steps down that path. 
